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Abstract
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate
n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over
the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms that do not involve any monetary payments.
We consider two natural measures of social welfare: the ordinal welfare factor which measures
the number of agents that are at least as happy as in some unknown, arbitrary benchmark
allocation, and the linear welfare factor which assumes an agent’s utility linearly decreases down
his preference lists, and measures the total utility to that achieved by an optimal allocation.
We analyze two matching mechanisms which have been extensively studied by economists.
The first mechanism is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) where agents are ordered in ac-
cordance with a randomly chosen permutation, and are successively allocated their best choice
among the unallocated items. The second mechanism is the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism
of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8], which computes a fractional allocation that can be expressed as
a convex combination of integral allocations. The welfare factor of a mechanism is the infimum
over all instances. For RSD, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is asymptotically 1/2, while
the linear welfare factor lies in the interval [.526, 2/3]. For PS, we show that the ordinal welfare
factor is also 1/2 while the linear welfare factor is roughly 2/3. To our knowledge, these results
are the first non-trivial performance guarantees for these natural mechanisms.
∗Dept. of Comp. and Inf. Science, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
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1 Introduction
In the one-sided matching market problem1, the goal is to efficiently allocate n items, I, to n
unit-demand agents ,A, with each agent a having a complete and private preference list ≥a over
these items. The problem arises in various applications such as assigning dormitory rooms to
students, time slots to users of a common machine, organ allocation markets, and so on. Since
the preferences are private, we focus on truthful (strategyproof) mechanisms in which agents do
not have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. One class of such mechanisms involve
monetary compensations/payments among agents. However, in many cases (e.g., in the examples
cited above), monetary transfer may be infeasible due to reasons varying from legal restrictions to
plain inconvenience. Hence, we focus on truthful mechanisms without money.
A simple mechanism for the one-sided matching problem is the following: agents arrive one-by-
one according to a fixed order σ picking up their most preferred unallocated item. This is called a
serial dictatorship mechanism. The random serial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism picks the order
σ uniformly at random among all permutations. Apart from being simple and easy to implement,
RSD has attractive properties: it is truthful, fair, anonymous/neutral, non-bossy2, and returns a
Pareto optimal allocation. In fact, it is the only truthful mechanism with the above properties [31],
and there is a large body of economic literature on this mechanism (see Section 1.2).
Despite this, an important question has been left unaddressed: how efficient is this mechanism?
To be precise, what is the guarantee one can give on the social welfare obtained by this algorithm
when compared to the optimal social welfare? As computer scientists, we find this a natural and
important question, and we address it in this paper.
How should one measure the social welfare of a mechanism? The usual recourse is to assume
the existence of cardinal utilities uij of agent i for item j which induces the preference list over
items with the semantic that agent i prefers item j to ℓ iff uij > uiℓ. A mechanism has welfare
factor α if for every instance the utility of the matching returned is at least α times that of the
optimum utility matching. There are a couple of issues with this. Firstly, it is not hard to see that
one cannot say anything meaningful about the performance of RSD if the utilities are allowed to be
arbitrary. This is because the optimum utility matching might be arising due to one particular agent
getting one particular item (a single edge), however with high probability, any random permutation
would lead to another agent getting the item and lowering the total welfare by a lot 3. Secondly,
the assumption of cardinal utilities inherently ties up the performance of the algorithm with the
‘cardinal numbers’ involved; the very quantities whose existence is only an assumption. Rather,
what is needed is an ordinal scale of analyzing the quality of a mechanism; a measure that depends
only on the order/preference lists of the agents rather than the precise utility values.
In this paper, we propose such a measure which we call the ordinal social welfare of a mechanism.
Given an instance of items and agents with their preference lists, we assume that there exists some
benchmark matching M∗, unknown to the mechanism. We stress here this can be any matching.
We say that the ordinal welfare factor of a mechanism is α, if for any instance and every benchmark
matching M∗, in the matching returned by the mechanism, at least αn agents (in expectation) get
an item which they prefer at least as much as their allocation in M∗.
1In the literature, the problem has been alternately called the house allocation or assignment problem.
2A mechanism is neutral if the allocation of items doesn’t change with renaming, and is non-bossy if no agent can
change his preference so that his allocation remains unchanged while someone else’s changes.
3The reader may notice similarities of RSD with online algorithms for bipartite matching problems. We elaborate
on the connection in Section 2.2.
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A discussion of this measure is in order. Firstly, the measure is ordinal and is well defined
whenever the utilities are expresses via preference lists. Secondly, the notion is independent of
any ‘objective function’ that an application might give rise to since it measures the ordinal social
welfare with respect to any desired matching. One disadvantage of the concept is that it is global:
it counts the fraction of the total population which gets better than their optimal match. In other
words, if everyone is “happy” in the benchmark matching M∗, then a mechanism with the ordinal
welfare factor α will make an α fraction of the agents happy. However if M∗ itself is inefficient, say
only 1% of the agents are “satisfied” in M∗, then the ordinal welfare factor does not say much. For
instance, it does not help for measures like “maximize number of agents getting their first choice”,
for in some instances, this number could be tiny even inM∗. Furthermore, it does not say anything
about the “happiness” of individual agents, e.g. a mechanism may have the ordinal welfare factor
close to 1, but there may exists an agent who is almost always allocated an item that he prefers less
than M∗. Finally, we observe that the ordinal welfare factor of any mechanism, even ones which
know the true preference lists, cannot be larger than 1/2. The reason for this is that the allocation
must be competitive with respect to all benchmark matchings simultaneously, and it can be seen
(Theorem 7) that in the instance when all agents have the same preference list, if M∗ is chosen to
be a random allocation, then no mechanism can have an ordinal welfare factor better than 1/2. As
our first result, we show that the ordinal welfare factor of RSD is in fact asymptotically 1/2.
Theorem 1. Given any instance and any matching M∗, the expected fraction of agents getting an
item in RSD which is as good as what they get in M∗ is at least 1/2 − o(1).
Till now we have focussed on the RSD mechanism since it is a simple (and almost unique)
truthful mechanism for the matching market problem. A mechanism is called truthful if misrepre-
senting his preference list doesn’t strictly increase the total utility of an agent, where the utility is
defined as the cardinal utility obtained by the agent on getting his allocated item. However, when
the utilities of agents are represented as preference lists, one needs a different definition. In light of
this, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] proposed a notion of truthfulness based on the stochastic domi-
nance. Roughly speaking, for an agent a random allocation rule stochastically dominates another
if the probability of getting one of his top k choices in the first rule is at least that in the second,
for any k.
Using this notion, [8] called a mechanism (weakly) truthful if no agent can obtain a stochastically
dominating allocation by misreporting his preference list. In other words, there exists at least one
utility function u that maps a preference list over items to cardinal utility values, such that the
mechanism is truthful if the user’s utility function is u. With this definition, the authors propose a
remarkable mechanism, which they called the probabilistic serial (PS) algorithm, and prove that it
is truthful in the above sense. At a high level, instead of allocating “best” items integrally to agents
(as RSD does), the PS algorithm does so fractionally obtaining a fractional perfect matching. By
the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem in combinatorial optimization, this implies a
distribution on integral matchings, and this is the output of the PS algorithm. We give a complete
description of the PS algorithm in Section 1.1.
PS and RSD are incomparable and results on RSD do not a priori imply those for PS. There
exist instances where RSD does strictly better than PS, and there exist instances where vice-versa
is true (see Appendix A). Nevertheless, PS has an ordinal welfare factor of at least a 1/2 as well.
Theorem 2. Given any instance and matching M∗, the expected fraction of agents which get an
item in PS which is as good as their allocation in M∗, is at least a 1/2.
2
Ordinal Welfare Factor and Popular Matchings Our notion of ordinal welfare factor is
somewhat related to the notion of popular matchings [16, 4, 24]. Given preference lists of agents,
a matching M is said to be more popular than M ′ if the number of agents getting strictly better
items in M is at least the number of agents getting strictly better items in M ′. A matching is
popular if no other matching is more popular than it. Thus the notion of popularity partitions the
set of agents into three groups while comparing two matching M and M ′ – (a) agents that prefer
M , (b) agents that are neutral, and (c) agents that prefer M ′ over M , where as in the case of
ordinal welfare factor, agents that prefer M , and agents that are neutral, are not distinguished.
It can be easily seen that any popular matching has an ordinal welfare factor of at least 1/2,
however, (a) not every input instance has a popular matching, and (b) no truthful algorithms are
known to compute them when they exist. A few modified measures for matchings have been studied
in the literature [25, 20, 24], namely (a) unpopularity factor (#agents that are unhappy/#agents
that are strictly happier), and (b) unpopularity margin (#agents that are unhappy – #agents that
are strictly happier), (c) popular mixed matchings. The ordinal welfare factor can be seen as a new
way of quantifying the popularity of a matching.
Linear Utilities. We also analyze the performance of RSD and PS mechanisms when agents’
utilities are linear, one of the most commonly studied special case of cardinal utilities. In this
model, we assume that the utility for an agent for his ith preference is n−i+1n .
A quick observation shows that any serial dictatorship mechanism achieves a welfare of at least
50% of the optimum: the agent at step t gets his tth choice or better giving him a utility of at least
(1 − (t − 1)/n); thus the total utility is at least (n + 1)/2, and the optimum is at most n. How
much better does RSD do? Intuitively, from the above calculation, one would expect the worst
case instance would be one where each agent gets one of his top o(n) choices; that would make the
optimum value (1− o(1))n. We call such instances as efficient instances since there is an optimum
matching where every one gets their (almost) best choice. We show that for efficient instances, RSD
achieves (asymptotically) at least 2/3 of the social optimum. Furthermore, there exists instances
where RSD does no better. These bounds hold for PS mechanism as well.
Theorem 3. When the utilities are linear and the instance is efficient, the welfare factor of RSD
is at least 2/3 − o(1). Furthermore, there exist efficient instances for which the welfare factor of
RSD is at most 2/3 + o(1).
Theorem 4. When the utilities are linear and the instance is efficient, the welfare factor of PS is
at least 2/3 − o(1). Furthermore, there exist efficient instances for which the welfare factor of PS
is at most 2/3 + o(1).
For general instances, we can show that PS achieves a social welfare of at least 66% (but not
quite 2/3) of the optimum (see Appendix C for details). However, we cannot extend our intuition
and prove a similar performance for RSD on general instances; a ‘balancing’ argument shows that
the performance of RSD for linear utilities is at least 52.6%, although we conjecture this can be
improved (see Appendix B for details).
Extensions. We consider two extensions to our model and focus on the performance of RSD
leaving that of PS as an open direction. In the first, we let the preference lists be incomplete. The
proof of Theorem 1 implies that the ordinal welfare factor of RSD remains unchanged. For linear
utilities, we generalize the definition as follows: for an agent with a preference list of length ℓ, the
first choice gives him a utility of 1 while the last item gives a utility of 1/ℓ. Our results show that
RSD doesn’t perform very well in this case.
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Theorem 5. For linear utilities, RSD gets at least Ω˜(n−1/3) fraction of the social optimum. Fur-
thermore, there are instances, where the welfare of RSD is at most O˜(n−1/3) fraction of the social
optimum.
In the second extension, we let the demand of an agent be for sets of size K or less, for some
K ≥ 1. Agents now arrive and pick their best ‘bundle’ among the unallocated items. The ordinal
welfare factor of a mechanism is now α if at least an α fraction of agents get a bundle that is as
good (assuming there is a complete order on the set of bundles) as what they got in an arbitrary
benchmark allocation. We show that RSD has ordinal welfare factor Θ(1/K).
Theorem 6. In the case when each agent has a maximum demand of K items, the ordinal welfare
factor of RSD is Θ(1/K).
1.1 Preliminaries
Utility Models, Truthful Mechanisms, Welfare Factors. As stated above, we consider two models
for utilities of agents. In the cardinal utility model, each agent a has a utility function ua : I → R≥0,
with the property that j >a ℓ iff ua(j) > ua(ℓ). Given a distribution on the matchings, the utility of
agent a is ua(M) :=
∑
M∈M p(M)ua(M(a)), where p(M) is the probability of matching M . In this
paper, we focus on the special case of linear utility model where the ith ranked item for any agent
a gives him a utility of (1 − (i − 1)/n). We call an instance efficient, if there is a matching which
matched every agent to an item in his top o(n) (for concreteness, let’s say this is n1/5) choices and
thus gives him utility of (1− o(1)). In the ordinal utility model, each agent a represents his utility
only via his complete preference list ≥a over the items.
A mechanism A is truthful if no agent can misrepresent his preference and obtain a better item.
In the cardinal utility model this implies that for all agents a and utility functions ua, u
′
a, we have
ua(M) ≥ ua(M
′) where M = A(u1, . . . , un) and M
′ = A(u1, . . . , u
′
a, . . . , un). In the ordinal utility
model, following [8], we call a mechanism A to be truthful if for all agents a the following holds.
Let M = A(>1, . . . , >n), and let M
′ = A(>1, . . . , >
′
a, . . . , >n) be the solution when a changes
his preference list. Then the randomized allocated to a returned by M ′ does not stochastically
dominate that returned by M . In fact, [8] define a stronger notion of truthfulness in which the
allocation to a returned byM stochastically dominates that returned byM ′. This is a strong notion
of truthfulness since it implies truthfulness for any cardinal utilities as well – if M stochastically
dominates M ′, then for any utility function ua(M) ≥ ua(M
′).
A mechanism has linear welfare factor of α if for all instances the (expected) sum of linear
utilities of agents obtained from the allocation of the mechanism is at least α times the optimal
utility allocation for that instance. A mechanism has ordinal welfare factor of α if for all instances,
and for all benchmark matchings M∗, at least α fraction of agents (in expectation) obtain an item
via the mechanism which is at least as good as that allocated in M∗.
The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism. The probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism was suggested by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8]. The mechanism fractionally allocates items to agents over multiple
phases, we denote the fraction of the item i allocated to an agent a by x(a, i). These fractions
are such that
∑
a∈A x(a, i) =
∑
i∈I x(a, i) = 1 for all agents a and items i. Thus this fractional
allocation defines a distribution on integral matchings, and this is the distribution returned by PS.
Initially, x(a, i) = 0 for every agent a and item i. We say that an item i is allocated if∑
a∈A x(a, i) = 1, otherwise we call it to be available. The algorithm grows x(a, i)’s in phases, and
in each phase one or more items get completely allocated. During a phase of the algorithm, each
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agent a grows x(a, i) at the rate of 1 where i is his best choice in the set of available items. The
current phase completes and the new phase starts when at least one item that was available in the
current phase, gets completely allocated. The algorithm continues until all items are allocated.
We make a few observations about the above algorithm which will be useful in our analysis.
Firstly note that the algorithm terminates at time t = 1, at which time all agents are fractionally
allocated one item, that is,
∑
i∈I x(a, i) = 1. This is because the LHS grows at the rate of 1 for all
agents in any point of time (one uses the fact the preference lists are complete). Secondly, note that
any phase lasts for time at least 1/n and at most 1. Therefore, by time < j/n for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
at most (j − 1) phases would’ve completed.
1.2 Related Work
As stated in the introduction, there is a huge amount of literature on matching markets starting
with the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [15], and we refer the reader to numerous detailed
surveys (the classic Roth and Sotomayor [28], and more recent ones by So¨nmez and U¨nver [30] and
Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [3]) for a more elaborate picture. In this section, we try to review the
papers which are most relevant to our paper.
The one-sided matching market design problem was first studied by Hylland and Zeckhauser
[21] who propose a mechanism to find a distribution on matchings via a market mechanism where
each agent is given equal, artificial budgets. Their mechanism returns Pareto optimal, envy-free
solutions; unfortunately it is not truthful. Zhou [32], answering a question of Gale [14], showed
that there can be no truthful mechanism which is anonymous/neutral and satisfies ex ante Pareto
optimality; this is a stronger notion of ex post Pareto optimality which we have discussed before.
Svensson [31] showed that serial dictatorship mechanisms are the only truthful mechanisms which
are (ex post) Pareto optimal, non bossy, and anonymous. The study of mechanisms with ordinal
utilities for this problem was started by Bogomolnaia and Moulin[8]. The probabilistic serial
mechanism was in fact proposed in an earlier paper on scheduling jobs by Cres and Moulin [11].
Following the work of [8], there was a list of work characterizing stochastic dominance [2, 9], and
generalizing it to the case of incomplete preference lists [23], and to multiple copies of items [10].
A generalization of the one-sided matching market design problem where the items are initially
owned by agents, and they need to be exchanged among themselves is called the market exchange
problem (or the housing market problem.) This problem has many applications, the most important
of which is the kidney exchange problem [27]. The exchange problem was introduced by Scarf and
Shapley [29] who were interested in core allocations; allocations where no subset of agents can
re-allocate their items and everyone be better off. They showed the core allocation is non-empty
via a constructive algorithm attributed to David Gale; this is Gale’s top trading cycle (TTC)
algorithm which is truthful and Pareto optimal. There has been a lot of work extending TTC
to various scenarios and characterizing truthful mechanisms in this model (we refer the interested
reader to the surveys [30] and [3] and the references therein); however the result most relevant to
work is the one due to Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [1]. They showed that in the one-sided market
mechanism problem, if one assumes a random initial endowment and runs the TTC algorithm, then
the behaviour (distribution on matchings) is exactly the same as that of RSD.
Finally, the study of mechanism design without money has been of recent interest in the com-
puter science community [26, 12]. We already have mentioned the relation to popular matchings
in the introduction. There has been works motivated by the market exchange problem [6, 13], and
item allocation problem [18, 19], however none of them address the problem that we study.
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2 Ordinal Welfare Factor of RSD and PS Mechanisms
In this section, we prove Theorems 1 and 2. We first show that the ordinal welfare factor of any
mechanism is at most 1/2 in the instance where every agent has the same preference list.
Theorem 7. If every agent has the same preference list (1, 2, . . . , n), then the ordinal welfare factor
of any mechanism is at most 1/2 + 1/2n.
Proof. A mechanism returns a probability distribution on matchings which we will interpret as a
distribution of permutations, let D be that distribution. We choose the benchmark matching M∗
to be a random matching, i.e. a random permutation π of the agents.
It suffices to show that for any fixed permutation σ ∈ D, the expected number of agents a such
that σ(a) > π(a) is (n−1)/2. The bound then holds for D. Since π is chosen uniformly at random,
the probability that π(a) ≤ σ(a) is precisely σ(a)/n. So the expected number of happy people for
the permutation σ is
∑
a∈A σ(a)/n = (n+ 1)/2.
2.1 Ordinal Welfare Factor of RSD
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. Let M∗ be the unknown benchmark matching. We call an
agent a dead at time t if he hasn’t arrived yet and all items as good as M∗(a) in his preference
list has been allocated. Let Dt be the expected number of dead agents at time t. Let ALGt be the
expected number of agents who get an item as good as their choice in M∗ by time t. From the
above definition, we get
ALGt+1 − ALGt = 1−
Dt
n− t
(1)
We will now bound Dt from above which along with (1) will prove the theorem.
Lemma 1. Dt ≤
(t+2)(n−t)
n+1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Before proving the lemma, note that adding (1) for t = 1 to n−1 gives ALGn−ALG1 ≥
∑n−1
t=1
(
1− t+2n+1
)
,
implying ALGn − ALG1 ≥ n/2− 2n/n. This proves that the ordinal welfare factor of RSD is at least
1/2 − o(1) proving Theorem 1.
Proof. Let us start with a few definitions. For an item i and time t, let ALLi,t be the event that
item i is allocated by time t. For an agent a and time t, let LATEa,t be the event that a arrives after
time t. The first observation is this: if an agent a is dead at time t, then the event ALLM(a),t and
LATEa,t must have occurred. Therefore we get
Dt ≤
∑
a∈A
Pr[ALLM(a),t ∧ LATEa,t] (2)
Note that Pr[LATEa,t] is precisely (1− t/n). Also, note that
∑
i∈I Pr[ALLi,t] = t. This is because all
agents are allocated some item. Now suppose incorrectly that ALLM(a),t and LATEa,t were indepen-
dent. Then, (2) would give us
Dt ≤ (1−
t
n
)
∑
a∈A
Pr[ALLM(a),t] = (1−
t
n
)
∑
i∈I
Pr[ALLi,t] =
t(n− t)
n
(3)
which is at most the RHS in the lemma. However, the events are not independent, and one can
construct examples where the above bound is indeed incorrect. To get the correct bound, we need
the following claim.
6
Claim 1.
Pr[ALLM(a),t ∧ LATEa,t]
(n− t)
≤
Pr[ALLM(a),t+1 ∧ LATEa,t+1]
(t+ 1)
Proof. This follows from a simple charging argument. Fix a relative order of all agents other than
a and consider the n orders obtained by placing a in the n possible positions. Observe that if the
event ALLM(a),t ∧ LATEa,t occurs at all, it occurs exactly (n− t) times when a’s position is t+ 1 to
n. Furthermore, crucially observe that if the position of a is 1 to t+ 1, the item M(a) will still be
allocated. This is because the addition of a only leads to worse choices for agents following him
and so if M(a) was allocated before, it is allocated even now. This proves that for every (n − t)
occurrences of ALLM(a),t ∧ LATEa,t, we have (t+1) occurrences of the event ALLM(a),t+1 ∧ LATEa,t+1.
The claim follows as it holds for every fixed relative order of other agents.
Now we can finish the proof of the lemma. From Claim 1, we get
t+ 1
n− t
· Pr[ALLM(a),t ∧ LATEa,t] ≤ Pr[ALLM(a),t+1]− Pr[ALLM(a),t+1 ∧ LATEa,t+1]
Taking the second term of the RHS to the LHS, adding over all agents, and invoking (2), we get
t+ 1
n− t
·Dt +Dt+1 ≤ t+ 1 (4)
Using the fact that Dt+1 ≥ Dt− 1 (the number of dead guys cannot decrease by more than 1), and
rearranging, proves the lemma.
2.2 RSD and online bipartite matching
In this section, we highlight the relation between RSD and algorithms for online bipartite matching.
As we show below, the analysis of RSD above can be seen as a generalization of online bipartite
matching algorithms. This section can be skipped without loss of continuity.
In the online bipartite matching problem, vertices of one partition (think of them as agents) are
fixed while vertices of the other partition (think of them as items) arrive in an adversarial order.
When an item arrives, we get to see the incident edges on agents. These edges indicate the set
of agents that desire this item. The algorithm must immediately match this item to one of the
unmatched agents desiring it (or choose to throw it away). In the end, the size of the obtained
matching is compared with the optimum matching in the realized graph.
Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [22] gave the following algorithm (KVV) for the problem: fix a
random ordering of the agents, and when an item arrives give it to the first unmatched agent in this
order. They proved4 that the expected size of the matching obtained is at least (1− 1/e) times the
optimum matching. For simplicity (and indeed this can be shown to be without loss of generality),
assume that the size of the optimum matching is indeed n, the number of agents and items. The
KVV theorem can be ‘flipped around’ to say the following. Suppose each agent has the preference
list which goes down its desired items in the order of entry of items. Then, if agents arrive in a
random order and pick their best, unallocated, desired item, in expectation an (1− 1/e) fraction of
agents are matched. That is, if we run RSD on this instance (with incomplete lists), an (1 − 1/e)
fraction of agents will get an item.
4In 2008, a bug was found in the original extended abstract of [22], but was soon resolved. See [17, 7, 5] for
discussions and resolutions.
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We should point out that the above result does not a priori imply an analysis of RSD, the reason
being that in our problem an agent a, when he arrives, is allocated an item even if that item is
worse than what he gets in the benchmark matching M∗. This might be bad since the allocated
item could be ‘good’ item for agents to come. In particular, if the order chosen is not random
but arbitrary, the performance of the algorithm is quite bad; in contrast, the online matching
algorithm still has a competitive ratio of 1/2. Concretely, consider the following instance: Agent
i for 2 ≤ i ≤ n have item (i − 1) as their first choice, and item i as their second choice. Agent 1
has item 1 as his first choice and item n as his second choice. M∗ matches agent 2, . . . , n to items
1, . . . , (n − 1) and agent 1 to item n. Now if agents arrive in order 1 to n, only agent 1 does as
well as its allocation in M∗. We now tailor our analysis of RSD to give another proof of the online
bipartite matching result.
Corollary 1. KVV matches at least (1− 1/e)n − 1 agents in expectation.
Proof. The analysis is exactly same as the proof of Theorem 1 except we have the following ‘savings’
– instead of
∑
i∈I Pr[ALLi,t] = t, we have
∑
i∈I Pr[ALLi,t] = ALGt. This is because by time t the
number of items allocated is precisely the number of agents who receive an item, which is ALGt. (4)
then evaluates to t+1n−t ·Dt+Dt+1 ≤ ALGt+1. Using the fact that Dt+1 ≥ Dt−1 and ALGt+1 ≤ ALGt+1,
we get 1n−t ·Dt ≤
1
n+1 · ALGt +
2
n+1 , which along with (1) gives us
ALGt+1 ≥
(
1−
1
n+ 1
)
ALGt +
(
1−
2
n+ 1
)
This solves to ALGn ≥ (1− 1/e) · (n− 1).
2.3 Ordinal Welfare Factor of PS
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. We suggest the reader to refer to the algorithm and its
properties as described in Section 1.1. In particular, we will use the following observation.
Observation 1: By time < j/n, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, at most (j−1) items are completely allocated.
Let M∗ be the unknown benchmark matching. For an agent a, let ta be the time in the run of
the PS algorithm at which the item M∗(a) is completely allocated. Observe that the probability
agent a gets an item M∗(a) or better is precisely ta, since till this time x(a, i) increases for items
i ≥a M
∗(a). Summing up all agents, we see that the ordinal welfare factor of the PS mechanism
is
∑
a ta. The observation above implies at most (j − 1) agents have ta < j/n. So,
∑
a ta ≥∑n
j=1(n− j + 1)/n ≥ n/2 + 1/2. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
3 Linear Welfare Factor of RSD and PS
In this section, we establish bounds on the linear welfare factor of RSD and PS mechanisms. We
first prove Theorem 3 in two lemmas. Recall that an instance is called efficient if there exists a
matching in which every agent is matched to an item in his top o(n) choices.
Lemma 2. When the utilities are linear and the instance is efficient, the linear welfare factor of
RSD is at least (2/3 − o(1)).
Proof. The proof almost directly follows from Lemma 1. Let Ut denote the expected utility obtained
by time t. Consider the agent coming at time t + 1. If he is not dead already, then he will get a
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utility of at least (1− o(1)) (since the instance is efficient). If he is dead, then he will get a utility
of at least (1− t/n). This is because only t items have been allocated and this agent takes an item
(t+ 1)th ranked or higher. Therefore,
Ut+1 − Ut ≥
(
1−
Dt
n− t
)
· (1− o(1)) +
Dt
n− t
· (1− t/n) ≥ 1− o(1)−
t
n
·
Dt
n− t
Using Lemma 1, we get Ut+1 − Ut ≥ 1 − o(1) −
t(t+2)
n(n+1) . Summing over all t, we get that the total
utility of RSD is at least (1− o(1))n − (n/3 + o(n)) = (2/3 − o(1))n.
The above analysis can be modified via a balancing trick to give a strictly better than 50%
guarantee for all instances in the case of linear utilities. However, the improvement we get is small,
and the analysis is not that informative. We defer it to the Appendix B.
Lemma 3. When the utilities are linear, there exists an efficient instance for which RSD gets a
utility of at most (2/3 + o(1))n.
Proof. Partition n agents and items into t blocks of size n/t each, where t = n1/5. We denote the
jth block of agents and items by Aj and Ij respectively, and they number from
(
(j−1)n
t + 1
)
to jnt .
We now illustrate the preference lists of agents. Fix an agent a in block Aj . Let he be the k
th
agent in the block, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n/t, i.e. his agent number is (j − 1)n/t + k. A random set
of t3 items is picked from each of blocks I1, . . . , Ij−1, and these form the first (j − 1)t
3 items in
his preference list, in increasing order of item number. The item (j − 1)n/t+ k is his ((j − 1)t3 +
1)th choice. His remaining choices are the remaining items considered in increasing order. This
completes the description of the preference lists of the agents.
Note that if every agent a is assigned the corresponding item with the same number, then each
agent gets one of his top t4 choices, leading to a utility of at least (1 − t
4
n ) = 1 − o(1). So, the
instance is indeed efficient. We now show that RSD gets utility at most 2n/3 + o(1).
Let σ be a random permutation of the agents. We divide σ into t chunks of n/t agents, with
the jth chunk, Sj, consisting of agents σ(
(j−1)n
t + 1) to σ(
jn
t ). Note that with high probability
(≥ (1 − 1/t3)), we have that for any block Aj and chunk Si, |Aj ∩ Si| ∈
[
(1− 1
t2
) n
t2
, (1 + 1
t2
) n
t2
]
.
We now state the crucial observation.
Claim 2. With high probability, at least (1− 1t3 ) fraction of the items in the first i blocks have been
allocated after arrival of first i chunks.
Proof. Fix an agent a in the first i chunks and consider the allocation to the agent a when he arrives.
If more than in/t3 items in set of items in I1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ii are left unallocated, then we claim that the
probability that the agent a is not allocated one of these free items is exponentially small. Note
that it3 items of the in/t items in the first i blocks form the top choices of agent a. Furthermore,
this set is chosen independently of all other agents. In particular, the probability that none of the
free items lie as one of these choices is at most
(
1− t
4
n
)in/t3
≤ e−t. Since t is large enough (assumed
to be n1/5), this probability is small enough to apply union bound over all agents.
Now we are ready to analyze RSD. Consider the (i+1)th chunk of agents. With high probability,
there are at least n
t2
(1− 1
t2
) agents from each block A1, . . . , Ai in Si+1. Since only in/t
3 items remain
from the first i block of items, at least in
t2
(1− 1
t2
)− in
t3
of these agents must get an item from blocks
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(i + 1) or higher. However, this gives them utility at most (1 − in/tn ) ≥ 1 − i/t. That is, the drop
in their utility to what they get in the optimum is at least i/t. Summing the total drop over all
agents and all chunks, we get that the difference between RSD and the optimum is at least
t∑
i=1
in
t2
(1−
1
t
)
i
t
= (1− o(1))
n
t3
n∑
i=1
i2 = n/3
Therefore, the social welfare of RSD is at most (2/3 + o(1))n.
Linear Welfare Factor of PS Mechanism We now establish the upper and the lower bound
on the linear welfare factor of the PS mechanism. As in the case of RSD, we focus on efficient
instances in the main body since they contain the main analysis ideas.
Lemma 4. When the utilities are linear and the instance is efficient, the linear welfare factor of
the PS mechanism is at least (2/3 − o(1)).
Proof. Let oa denote the utility obtained by agent a in the utility optimal matching. Since the
instance is efficient, oa = 1− o(1) for all agents a.
Consider the jth phase of PS, and suppose it lasts for time ∆j . Observation 1 implies that∑
j≤ℓ∆j ≥ ℓ/n. Furthermore, in phase j, at least (n − j + 1) agents are getting utility at a rate
higher than their utility in the optimal matching. This is because at most (j − 1) items have been
completely allocated. Furthermore, the remaining (j − 1) agents are getting utility at a rate at
least (1 − (j − 1)/n) since they are growing their x(a, i) on their jth choice or better. So, the
total utility obtained by PS is at least
∑n
j=1∆j ·
(
(n− j + 1) · (1− o(1)) + (j − 1) · (1− j−1n )
)
≈∑n
j=1∆j
(
n2−(j−1)2
n
)
Now, the RHS is smallest if ∆1 is as small as possible, modulo which, ∆2 is as small as possible
and so on. Given the constraint on ∆j ’s, we get that the RHS is at least
∑n
j=1
n2−(j−1)2
n2 ≈ 2n/3.
This implies a 2/3 approximation.
Lemma 5. When the utilities are linear, there exists an efficient instance such that the total utility
of PS is at most (2/3 + o(1)) times the optimum.
Proof. The construction of the lower bound example is similar to (but not the same as) that given
in the proof of Lemma 3. We have n agents and items divided in t blocks (we assume t divides n)
of n/t agents each, t will be o(n) in the construction. We denote the jth block of agents and items
by Aj and Ij respectively, and they number from
(
(j−1)n
t + 1
)
to jnt .
The agents’ preference lists are as follows. Fix an agent a in block Aj . Let he be the k
th agent
in this block, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n/t, i.e. his agent number is (j − 1)n/t + k. The first j preferences
of this agent are precisely the kth items in the blocks I1 to Ij, in the increasing order of the item
number. That is, for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j − 1, the (ℓ + 1)th choice of agent a is the item number ℓn/t + k.
Furthermore, for j < l ≤ t, the item number ℓn/t+ k, present in block Iℓ, is the (ℓn/t+1)
th choice
of agent a. Thus, so far we have described where t items reside in the preference list of a. The
remaining n− t choices of his are all the remaining items from 1 to n, in that order.
Lemma 6. The optimum social welfare of the instance is at least n− t.
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Proof. Note that agent a whose number is (j−1)n/t+k can be assigned item (j−1)n/t+k, which
is his jth choice. So, in this matching, every agent gets his tth choice or higher, leading to a social
welfare of at least n(1− t/n).
Lemma 7. In this instance, PS attains a social welfare of at most (2/3 + o(1))n.
Proof. The following claim is the key observation in the proof of this lemma.
Claim 3. In the run of PS, each phase is of duration 1/t, and all items in set Ij are completely
allocated in phase j.
Note that initially all agents prefer items in I1, furthermore, each item in I1 is the best choice
of exactly t agents. So at time 1/t, all items in I1 are completely allocated. Subsequently, the
best choice of every agent among the remaining items lies in I2 and arguing inductively proves the
claim.
Now we can complete the proof of the lemma. Note that each agent in block Aj obtains precisely
1/t fraction of an item from every block. For the first j blocks, he gets utility at most 1 per item.
Subsequently, for j < ℓ ≤ t, he gets utility (1 − (ℓ−1)(n/t)n ). So, the utility of an agent in Aj is at
most 1t
(
1 · j +
∑t
ℓ=j+1
t−ℓ+1
t
)
≈ 1t
(
j + (t− j) − t
2−j2
2t
)
= 12 +
j2
2t2
where the ≈ hides the additive
o(1) term. Summing over all blocks j and all agents in a block we get that the social welfare of PS
is at most n2 +
n
6 + o(n) = 2n/3 + o(n).
For PS, we can do a much better analysis for general instances with linear utilities, than what we
can do for RSD. We defer this to the Appendix C.
4 Extensions
In this section, we study two extensions to the model studied thus far, (a) incomplete preference
list: where for every agent, there exists a set of items S such that he has a complete preference list
over items from I−S and he prefers to stay unmatched over an assignment of an item from S, and
(b) relaxation of the unit-demand assumption: where an agent has demand only for subsets of size
K and he has a complete preference list over all subsets of size K, for some parameter K. In both
cases, we analyze the performance of RSD whose definition can be easily modified to both cases.
We leave the extension and analysis of PS to these cases as an open direction.
4.1 Incomplete Preference Lists
We assume that there are n agents and m items where each agent a has an ordered preference list
La on some arbitrary subset of {1, 2, ...,m}. We note that the proof of Theorem 1 can be modified
easily to show that the ordinal welfare factor of RSD is at least 1/2 even in this case.
Now we focus on the linear utility model. In this model, if agent a is allocated the jth item on
the list, denoted by La(j), it gets a utility of
|La|+1−j
|La|
. Our main result is that the linear welfare
factor of RSD drops to Θ˜(1/n1/3). We now focus here on establishing almost tight upper and lower
bounds on the linear welfare factor of RSD.
Linear Welfare Factor of RSD with partial lists is O˜(1/n1/3):
We start by showing a family of instances that establish an upper bound of O˜(1/n1/3) on
the linear welfare factor of RSD. The set A of agents is partitioned into two sets, namely, a set
G = {g1, g2, ..., ga} of good agents, and a set B = {b1, b2, .., bb} of bad agents, where a = n
2/3 and
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b = n− n2/3. The set of items is partitioned into two sets IG = {1, 2, ..., p} and IB = {1
′, 2′, ..., q′}
where p = n2/3 and q = n1/3. For each i ∈ [1..a], the preference list of agent gi consists of a single
item, namely, {i}. For each j ∈ [1..b], the preference list of agent bj consists of items in IB ordered
as {1′, 2′, ..., q′}, followed by the item i ∈ IG such that i = 1+(j mod n
2/3). An agent bj ∈ B whose
preference list ends in an item i ∈ IG, is referred to as a type-i bad agent; there are (n
1/3−1) type-i
bad agents for each i ∈ [1..a].
It is easy to verify that OPT is at least n2/3, since any allocation that assigns items in IG to
agents in G in accordance with the unique matching defined by the preference lists of agents in G
achieves n2/3 utility. We now show that in contrast, the expected utility of RSD on this instance
is bounded by O(n1/3 log n), yielding the desired lower bound.
Let t1 = 2n
2/3 and let t2 = 9n
2/3 lnn. The analysis relies on the probability of occurrence (over
the choice of random arrival ordering of the agents) of the four events defined below. We bound
the probabilities of these events by careful application of Chernoff’s inequality.
E0: We say that the event E0 occurs if there exists an i ∈ [1..a] such that the number of type-i
bad agents that arrive in the first t1 steps exceeds (n
1/3 − 1)/2. Then
Pr[E0] ≤ (n
2/3)e−Ω(n
1/3) = e−Ω(n
1/3)
E1: We say that the event E1 occurs if the number of good agents that arrive in the first t1 steps
exceeds n1/3. Then Pr[E1] ≤ e
−Ω(n1/3).
E2: We say that event E2 occurs if there exists an i ∈ [1..a] such that no type-i bad agent arrives
in the interval (t1, t2]. Then
Pr[E2] = Pr[E2 | E0] · Pr[E0] + Pr[E2 | E0] · Pr[E0] ≤ Pr[E0] + Pr[E2 | E0] ≤ 1/n
2
E3: We say that the event E3 occurs if the total number of good agents that arrive in the interval
[1, t2] exceeds 18n
1/3 lnn. Then Pr[E3] ≤ 1/n
2.
Thus Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3] ≤ 3/n
2.
We now analyze the performance of RSD when none of the events E1, E2, or E3 occur. If the
event E1 does not occur, then by time t1, at least n
1/3 agents from B must have arrived, so by time
t1, all items in IB must have been assigned to agents in B. Total contribution from items in IB is
thus bounded by n1/3. Additionally, if the event E2 does not occur, we are guaranteed that by time
t2, all items in IG must have been assigned to agents in B∪G. Finally, if the event E3 also does not
occur, then at most 18n1/3 lnn items in IG get assigned to agents in G, and the rest are assigned to
agents in B. Thus the total contribution from items in IG can be bounded by O(n
1/3 log n). Hence
the expected utility of RSD is bounded by
Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3] · (n
1/3 + n2/3) + Pr[(E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3)] · O(n
1/3 log n) = O(n1/3 log n).
This completes the proof that the linear welfare factor of RSD is at most O˜(1/n1/3).
Linear Welfare Factor of RSD with incomplete preference lists is Ω˜(1/n1/3):
We now show that the linear welfare factor of RSD is at least Ω˜(1/n1/3). We start by mak-
ing two easy observations, namely, (a) OPT is at most n, (b) linear welfare factor of RSD is
max{Ω(1/OPT),Ω(OPT/n)}. It thus suffices to show that linear welfare factor of RSD is Ω˜(1/n1/3)
when n1/3 ≤ OPT ≤ n2/3.
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Let G and IG respectively denote the subset of agents and items that contributes to OPT, that is,
there exists a perfect matching M between G and IG. Note that |G| = |IG| ≥ OPT. We start with
the assumption that each agent in G contributes Ω(1) – this case essentially captures the main idea
of the analysis. We then briefly sketch the slight modification needed to eliminate this assumption.
First observe that if RSD is run on the agents in G alone, then for a uniformly at random
ordering of agents in G, in expectation, Ω(G) agents match to items along edges of utility Ω(1).
Now when RSD is run on the entire set of agents, if the total expected utility achieved by RSD
from agents in G is at least OPT/(2n1/3), then we are already done. Otherwise, there must exist
a set B1 of bad agents (need not be disjoint from G) such that (a) the list of each agent in B1
contains at least 2n1/3 elements, and (b) |B1| ≥ 2n
1/3|G|. Let
I1 =
⋃
i∈B1
⋃
1≤j≤n1/3
Li(j)
Observe that for any ordering of agents in B1, the first n
1/3 agents in B1 are able to match
to an item in the first-half of their respective lists, deriving a utility of at least n1/3/2. Thus in
absence of any other agents, any execution of RSD on agents in B1 alone derives a total utility of
n1/3/2 or more. Now when RSD is run on the entire set of agents, if the total expected utility in
RSD from agents in B1 is at least (n
1/3)/2, we are once again done since OPT ≤ n2/3 by our earlier
assumption.
If not, there must exist a set B2 of very bad agents (need not be disjoint from G∪B1) such that
(
|B1|
|B2|
)(
n1/3
2
)
<
OPT
2n1/3
.
Thus
|B2| >
n2/3|B1|
OPT
≥ 2n,
a contradiction!
Finally, to eliminate the assumption that OPT matches agents in G to the set IG along edges
of utility Ω(1), we note that there must exist a set G′ ⊆ G and a set I ′ ⊆ IG such that for some
α ∈ (0, 1], (i) OPT matches items in I ′ to agents in IG along edges of utility Θ(α), and (ii) the utility
contributed by this matching is Ω(OPT/ log n). This follows from a standard geometric grouping
argument. We can now focus on agents-item pairs defined by G′ and I ′, and apply the same
argument as above.
Without Randomness: We note that randomness is crucial to achieving non-trivial linear welfare
factor in case of partial preference lists. If the permutation σ on agents is chosen deterministically,
then the linear welfare factor drops to Θ(log n/n). We refer to this algorithm as the serial dicta-
torship (SD) algorithm.
An O(log n/n) bound on the linear welfare factor of SD follows from the following family of
instances where OPT is n/2 while there exists an arrival order on which SD achieves only O(log n)
overall utility. Assume that n is an even integer. There are n/2 items in the instance, numbered 1
through n/2. The ordered list Li is defined to be {1, 2, ..., i}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2, and Li = {i− (n/2)},
for n/2 < i ≤ n. Suppose the agents arrive in order 1 through n. Then it is easy to see that for
each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n/2}, agent i chooses item i and obtains utility of 1/i. Thus the total utility
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achieved is H(n/2) = Θ(log n). On the other hand, the optimal allocation assigns item i to agent
i+ (n/2), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2, achieving an overall utility of n/2.
On the other hand, SD always achieves a linear welfare factor of Ω(log n/n). Fix an optimal
solution, say OPT, and let k be the number of items allocated in OPT. Clearly, k ≥ |OPT|. Since SD
always outputs a maximal matching between agents and items, it follows that the total number of
items allocated in any execution of SD must be at least k/2. Fix an execution of SD, and let I ′ be
the ordered set of items that get allocated in SD. Then it is easy to see that when the jth item in
I ′ is allocated, the utility derived is at least 1/j. Thus the total utility obtained by SD is at least
H(k/2) = Ω(log k). The performance ratio of SD is at most max1≤k≤n k/H(k/2) = Θ(n/ log n).
4.2 Non-Unit Demands
We now analyze the ordinal welfare factor of RSD when each agent desires a bundle of K items
for some integer parameter K and each agent has a preference list that defines an ordering over
the subsets of items of size K. We show that in this case, the ordinal welfare factor of RSD is
Θ(1/K). We will show that an upper bound of 1/K holds on the RSD ordinal welfare factor even
when preference lists are complete while the RSD ordinal welfare factor is at least Ω(1/K) if the
preference lists are partial.
To see that the ordinal welfare factor is bounded from above by 1/K, consider the following
instance with n agents and nK items where the agents are partitioned into p = n/K groups
of K agents each. Let A1, A2, ..., Ap denote these groups of agents. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ K and
1 ≤ i ≤ p, the preference list of the jth agent in group Ai is as follows: the first choice is the
item set {(i − 1)K2 + 1, (i − 1)K2 + K + 1, ..., (i − 1)K2 + (K − 1)K + 1}, the second choice is
the item set {(i − 1)K2 + (j − 1)K + 1, (i − 1)K2 + (j − 1)K + 2, ..., (i − 1)K2 + (j − 1)K +K},
the next (
(K2
K
)
− 2) choices consist of an arbitrary ordering of the remaining K-element subsets of
items {(i− 1)K2+1, (i− 1)K2+2, ..., (i− 1)K2+K2}, and finally, this is followed by an arbitrary
ordering on the remaining subsets. Thus the first choice of each agent in any group Ai intersects
with the first and second choices of every other agent in the group. Moreover, it is easy to see
that each agent also matches to one of the first
(K2
K
)
choices on its list. Thus allocations made to
agents in one group never interfere with the allocations made to agents in another group. Now fix
the matching M that allocates to each agent its second preference – it is easy to verify that this
allocation is conflict-free. Consider now a run of the RSD algorithm. The first agent to arrive in a
group Ai always gets his first preference. However, once this allocation is done, no other agent in
the group Ai can be allocated any item. Thus the ordinal welfare factor of RSD on this instance is
precisely 1/K.
On the other hand, an argument similar to that in Theorem 1 shows that the performance of
RSD is at least 12K − o(
1
K ). The argument is the following: by the time the t
th agent arrives, at
most Kt items have been taken away. Of the (n− t) agents remaining, at least n− (K+1)t of them
have their optimal bundle intact, as Kt items can hit at most the bundles of Kt agents. So, the
probability the tth agent is happy is at least n−(K+1)tn−t . Therefore, the expected number of happy
agents is at least
n/(K+1)∑
t=1
(n− (K + 1)t)/(n − t)
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The expression simplifies to
n−Kn ·
n/(K+1)∑
t=1
1
n− t
≈ n (1−K(ln(1 + 1/K))) ≥ n/2K − o(1/K)
5 Conclusions and Open Directions
In this paper, we studied the social welfare of two well studied mechanisms, RSD and PS, for
one-sided matching markets. We focussed on two measures: one was the ordinal welfare factor
which we believe is a new way to measure efficiency when agents utilities are obtained as rankings
or preference lists, the other was the natural linear utilities measure which assumed that the utility
of an agent dropped linearly down his preference list.
We performed a tight analysis of the ordinal welfare factors of both mechanisms, and the linear
welfare factor in the case of efficient instances: instances where the optimum matching gave every
agent one of his first o(n) top choices. An open problem is to perform a tight analysis of the case
of linear welfare factor for general instances.
We think the notion of ordinal welfare factor and the definitions of truthfulness in case of ordinal
utilities will be useful for other problems as well where the utilities are expressed as preference lists
rather than precise numbers. Examples which come to mind are scheduling, voting, and ranking
applications.
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A Comparison of PS and RSD
A question might arise whether one of the two algorithms is as good as the other in all instances,
when one considers the two efficiency measures studied in the paper. In this subsection we show,
via examples, that such a statement doesn’t hold true for either measure. Both examples are taken
from the paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8].
Instance 1
1 a b c d
2 a b c d
3 b a d c
4 b a d c
a b c d
1 5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
2 5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
3 1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
4 1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
a b c d
1 1/2 0 1/2 0
2 1/2 0 1/2 1/12
3 0 1/2 0 1/2
4 0 1/2 0 1/2
Instance 2
1 a b c
2 a c b
3 b a c
a b c
1 1/2 1/6 1/3
2 1/2 0 1/2
3 0 5/6 1/6
a b c
1 1/2 1/4 1/4
2 1/2 0 1/2
3 0 3/4 1/4
In the two instances above, the first table shows the preference lists of agents (numbered 1,2, . . .)
over items (denoted as a, b, . . .). The second table shows the randomized allocation obtained form
the RSD mechanism, the third shows that obtained via the PS mechanism.
Let us consider the linear utilities case first. In the first instance, RSD gets a utility of
4 · 14 · (4 · 5/12 + 3 · 1/12 + 2 · 5/12 + 1 · 1/12) = 34/12. While PS obtains a utility of 4 ·
1
4 ·
(4 · 1/2 + 2 · 1/2) = 3. So PS does better than RSD. In the second instance, the calculation shows
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the utility of RSD is greater than that of PS: the utilities on the allocations where they differ for RSD
is 13 ·(2·1/6+1·1/3+3·5/6+1·1/6) = 10/9, while for PS is
1
3 ·(2·1/4+1·1/4+3·3/4+1·1/4) = 13/12.
Moving to ordinal welfare factor, in the second instance, if the benchmark matching is (1, a), (2, c), (3, b),
then the expected number of agents made happy by PS is 9/4, while that in RSD is 7/3. However
if the benchmark matching is (1, b), (2, a), (3, c), then the ordinal welfare factors of PS and RSD are
9/4 and 13/6 respectively. It is easy to check that both benchmark matchings are pareto-optimal.
B Performance of RSD with linear utilities
Let α and β be two parameters between 0 and 1 to be fixed later. We assume that at least αn
agents get an item which is in their top βn choices. It is easy to see that if not, the optimum is at
most (1− β + αβ)n and RSD gives a linear welfare factor of 12(1−β+αβ) .
Call these αn agents good. Now consider the argument in Lemma 3. At time t, the expected
number of remaining good agents is α(n− t). Thus, with probability at least
(
α− dtn−t
)
, we choose
a good agent and he gets an item from his top βn choices, thus he gets a utility of at least 1 − β,
and so the benefit over the ‘trivial’ (1 − t/n) utility is (t/n − β). Thus, the total benefit obtained
at time t is at least
(
α− dtn−t
)
· (t/n − β). Using the fact that dt ≤ (t+ 2)(n − t)/(n + 1), we get
that the total benefit over 50% is at least
∫ t2
t1
(
α− t+2n+1
) (
t
n − β
)
, where t1 = βn (when the second
term becomes positive), and t2 = α ∗ (n + 1) − 2 (after which the first term becomes negative).
Therefore, the RSD mechanism gives an approximation of at least the minimum of this integral
and 12(1−β+αβ) , for any α and β. For α = 0.77 and β = 0.22, we get the above expression to be
52.6%.
C Performance of PS with linear utilities
We now consider the performance of PS with linear utilities even when the instance may not be
efficient, i.e. some agents get less than 1− o(1) in the optimum matching. Let M∗ be the optimal
matching.
Consider items in the order in which they are fully allocated in the run of PS algorithm (break
ties arbitrarily). For an item i in this order, let a be the agent such that M ∗ (a) = i and let ui
be its utility for item i. The social optimum is
∑
i ui. We denote it by OPT. Now we compute the
total utility of items assigned to a in PS. From Observation ??, we get that in the time interval
[k−1n ,
k
n ] for 1 ≤ k ≤ i, agent a will obtain utility at a rate of at least max{ui, (n− k + 1)/n}. This
is because in this time interval both M∗(a) and his kth choice are available. Similarly, for k > i,
agent a gets utility at a rate (n − k + 1)/n in the interval [k−1n ,
k
n ]. So, the total utility of agent a
is at least
∑n
k=1
n−k+1
n ≥ 1/2 if ui ≤ (n − i)/n, and it is
1
2 +
(ui−n−in )
2
2 otherwise. We denote the
total utility of the assignment in the PS algorithm by ALG.
Observe that, if for any i, ui < (n − i)/n, then increasing ui increases the OPT but leaves ALG
unchanged. Since we are looking at an upper bound on the performance PS algorithm, it is safe to
assume that, for every i, ui ≥ (n− i)/n. We want to show that there exists a constant β ≤ 1 such
that
ALG ≥ βOPT (5)
for any set of values of ui, 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1. By taking a partial derivative w.r.t. ui, and using the fact
that ui ≤ 1, we see that the minimizer of ALG is min
(
1, n−in + β
)
. Now we compute the values of
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OPT and ALG with these values of ui.
OPT =
∑
i
(ui) (6)
=
∑
1≤i≤βn
1 +
∑
βn≤i≤n
(
β −
i
n
)
(7)
=
n
2
+ βn−
β2
2
(8)
ALG =
n
2
+
∑
1≤i≤n
(
ui −
n−i
n
)2
2
(9)
=
n
2
+
∑
1≤i≤βn
i2
2
+
∑
βn≤i≤n
β2n
2
(10)
=
n
2
+
βn
2
(1− β) +
β3
6
(11)
Recall that β should satisfy ALG ≥ βOPT. Solving for this gives β = 0.6602. It will be interesting
to close the curiously small gap between the upper bound and the lower bound.
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